A, INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of 2000, the only international humanitarian law or criminal law judges and prosecutors were pai-t of interiiatiorlal tribl~ilals at The Hague and Asusha, which stood separate from local judicial systems. Peacekeeping rnissions had often involved international rule-of-la\?; assistailce and expertise provided by the United Nations (UN), tlie Orgaliizatioll for Security and Cooperatiori in Europe (OSCE), and the American Bar Association's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (ABACEELI) and many other internatiollal organizations. Peacekeeping missions with "heavy footpsints" sometimes involved moilitoring aild even supervision by iliternational authorities. such as the UN AMissioii in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNAMIBH)-for police-and the Office of the High Representative and UNMlBH's Judicial System Assessment Pi-ograrnmefor judiciary. But international judges and prosecutors in inissions were limited to assistance, monitoring or oversight: They did not participate or act withill the domestic judicial system. Thcn, in Fcbn~ary 2000, for the first time, the Lnited Kations inscrted international judges and prosecutors (IJP) into a local criminal justice system to work alongside local judges. Internationals in the United Nations Mission in ICosovo (LJNMIIC) were granted the same co~npetencies as the locals, except that the IJP \?;crc li~nitcd to criminal cases. A year later, the Kosovo IJP program had evolved into a system of special international-majority trial and appellate panels, which '~vcrc assigned by 11~lblIK to all war cri~ncs cases, as well as all significant cases of organized crime and "power vacuum" and "payback" crimes," including terrorism. inter-ethnic violence, political assassinations. and corruption.
Soon thereailter, IJP were also appointed 111 East Tlmor, and latcr to the Spcclal Court of Sierra Leone and the Special Chamber of Bowia & Hcr~egovina.
Cambodia's Extraordinary Chambers were recently approved by the UN and are under consideration by the Cambodian National Assembly. The Kosovo 1JP were unlike these internationalized courts that followed lmowevel; in that Kosovo IJP had the broadest jurisdiction; its 1JP could take on any case of any crime. including new cases and cases already assigned to local judges,' wllile IJP subject-matter jurisdiction in other countries was us~lally linlited by law to certain categories -war crimes, or crimes committed in conjunction with war ciinles during a specific conflict."
The ability of Kosovo's IJP to take on an). crime by selecting any case arid ally type of crime proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the unlimited tlexibility of Kosovo's IJP to select any case is an advantage because an impartial international panel can provide justice i 11 any politically explosive case for which the local judges do not yet have the appearance of partiality or the capacity to withstand pressure or threats, such as a domestic-violence case of an organized crime I<ingpin or a political assassirlation by feuding party factions. On the other hanct this flexibility in case selectioli is arguably vulnerable to political abuse and has been criticized by some as a violation ofjudicial independence because, in the absence of transparent criteria defining international jurisdiction, the UNMIK administration can take any case from the local judiciary and require an international panel. Others regard it as a threat to the judicial principles, valued heavily in civil law especially, of certainty and legality. Nor can the potential negative effect upon the local judiciary's capacity and professionalism be ignored for without an effective transitional phase-out of IJP,? the local judges will lac]< experience in trying such politically se~isitive cases that would otherwise build their capacity forjustice. This article will discuss the three phases of international involvement in justice in Kosovo. First, the period from June 1999tthrough February 2000. during Tor example. e\en if a case iiad already been assigned by the local court President to a local i n~e s t i g a t i~e or presiding judge, or by the local District Prosecutor to a deputy district prosecutor.
2 Lnder the U\ Transitional Administration in East Tinior (LNTAET), IJP-majority panels with a third local judge have exclusi~e jurisdiction of war crimes. cri~nes against hun~anity (CAH). genocide, and torture. and of rn~lrder and rape cornrnitted between 1 Ja~luary 1999 and 25 October 1999. Sierra 1-cone's Special Court IJP and Cambodia's IJP will adjudicate oiily war crimes, CAH. and genocide; Sierra 1.eone's 1JP also have j~irisdiction over wartime ~iolations of sexual abuse of girls and arson during the conflict. Bosnia & Herrego\ina's State Court lebcl \nil1 have two special cha~nbers for IJP: one for war crimes, CAI1 and genocide, and one for trans-entity organized crinle and economic crime, (The entities referred to are Serbia and Bosnia & Her~egovina.) Tlle currently discussed transition niodels assun~e a siniple linear phase-out (e.g., only rni~lority IJ representation in trial courts. tlie~l iio IS iii trial coi~rts but rniliorily 1J represeritatioii or1 the S~iprerne Court. etc.), arid some eben assume that if the final stat~ls of iiidepeliiie~ice is granted thcn thc presence of IJP should cease. 'l'his is not necessarily the best policy, nor is it necessary. The use of IJP and oversight of the court system in Bosnia by OHR demonstrate that state status is not a bar to continued use of IJP or interiiatioiial o\ersiglir.
